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The "Misuse" Defense in Drug Products
Liability Cases
Jonathan E. Grantt
I. Introduction
It is quite common for a prescription drug to have serious
adverse side effects for the user-patient. Often, however, the pre-
scription drug manufacturer warns about these effects by pub-
lishing a Food and Drug Administration approved warning in
the Physician's Desk Reference1 or by enclosing a package in-
sert. Regrettably, some physicians, when prescribing a medica-
tion, will ignore or fail to read the issued warnings, resulting in
injury or death to the patient. Consequently, both the physician
and the drug company are sued. This Article will explore the
legal defenses of the drug company in such situations.
II. Background
A. Federal Statutes and Regulations
The 1906 Food and Drug Act was the first comprehensive
federal law regulating drugs.2 It was silent, however, on the man-
ner in which drugs should be dispensed.3 When the 1938 Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 4 was enacted, it too was silent
with respect to the dispensing status of drugs. However, it took
only six months from the date of passage of the 1938 Act for the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue administrative
pronouncements which initiated the distinction between over-
the-counter and prescription drugs.
t B.S. (Microbiology), Cum Laude, University of Maryland, 1978; M.A. (Biology),
Johns Hopkins University, 1980; J.D., The American University, Washington College of
Law, 1984; Member, New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. See infra note 24.
2. Kaplan, Over-the-Counter and Prescription Drugs: The Legal Distinction under
Federal Law, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. LAW J. 441 (1982) [hereinafter Kaplan].
3. Id.
4. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
1
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This distinction began in August 1938 when the FDA issued
its first "trade correspondence" announcing that sulfanilamide-
containing drugs were dangerous unless their dosage was prop-
erly adjusted and their use "intelligently and expertly di-
rected."5 Within a few months of the first trade correspondence,
the FDA issued a general announcement requiring a warning la-
bel on all drugs that might be considered dangerous to health
unless used under appropriate supervision.'
In December 1938, only a few months after the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act was enacted, the FDA officially designated
drugs requiring "appropriate supervision" as "prescription
5. Trade Correspondence One (TC-1), Aug. 26, 1938, reprinted in V. KLEINFELD &
C.W. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT, JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REc-
ORD 1938-1949, 561 (1949) [hereinafter KLEINFELD]. The agency wrote that the indiscrim-
inate use of such drugs would be considered violative of that section of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act that deems a drug to be "misbranded" if it is "dangerous to health
when used in the dosage or manner or with the frequency or duration prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in [its] labeling."
The FDA stated that sulfanilamide drugs should be labeled with a warning caution-
ing against their unsupervised use by the public. TC-4 cited in KLEINFELD at 562.
6. Id. at TC-4 which states:
You are familiar with the trade notices issued by this Administration on August
26 and September 8, 1938, relating to the distribution of preparations containing
aminopyrine, cinchophen, neocinchophen, sulfanilamide, and related products. In
brief, these notices announced the Administration's opinion that such drugs, if
distributed so that they would be used by the general public without appropriate
medical supervision, would be regarded as misbranded in violation of Section
502(j) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [redesignated as Section 352(0].
Following the issuance of those announcements, manufacturers generally
placed upon their labels such warnings as 'To be used under the direction of a
physician only,' with or without a statement to the effect that the drug has been
reported to have caused untoward reactions in some individuals.
That these warnings are not adequate to prevent the indiscriminate distribu-
tion and use of such drugs is obvious from the fact that, notwithstanding such
labelings, they are reaching the general public in considerable quantities.
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that to the effect the obvious pur-
pose of the law is the protection of the public health, preparations of the character
referred to above will be regarded as misbranded if they are not labeled with a
warning so conspicuous as to certainly arrest attention, and in such informative
terms as will not fail to apprise the user of the danger of irreparable injury if the
article is consumed without adequate and continuous medical supervision.
It should be understood that this principle applies not only to the specific
drugs which were dealt with in the trade announcements referred to above, but is
applicable to all drugs which may be dangerous to health unless used under ap-
propriate supervision.
Please acknowledge receipt of this letter.
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/2
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drugs."' Under the FDA regulation, drugs were exempt from the
statutory requirement that labeling include adequate directions
for use,8 if the label of a drug carried the statement "Caution:
To be used only by or on the prescription of a physician."9 One
of the other conditions for obtaining the exemption was that the
labeling for the drug could not bear any information on condi-
tions of use for the product that were "likely to be understood
by the ordinary individual."10
In the next thirteen years, the FDA continued to refine the
distinction it had established between "prescription" and "non-
prescription" drugs. In 1941, the adequate directions for use ex-
emption was amended to prohibit any labeling representation
concerning conditions of use for a drug that carried the "Cau-
tion" legend."
In 1944, the FDA, through additional regulation, limited the
availability of the exemption from adequate direction for use to
any drug product which "because of its toxicity or other potenti-
ality for harmful effect or the method of its use or the collateral
measures necessary to its use, is not generally recognized among
experts ... as safe and efficacious for use except ... under the
use of a physician."" In 1951, the Humphrey-Durham Amend-
ment was enacted, which statutorily formalized the differences
between over-the-counter and prescription drugs.13
The current Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,14 for
the purposes of regulating the labeling of drug products, contin-
ues to distinguish between over-the-counter drugs and prescrip-
tion drugs. Nonprescription drugs are deemed misbranded 5 if
7. 3 Fed. Reg. 3167-68 (1938).
8. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 442 (citing 3 Fed. Reg. 3167-68 (1938)).
9. Id. (citing 3 Fed. Reg. 3168 (1938)).
10. Id.
11. 6 Fed. Reg. 1920 (1941).
12. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 442 (citing 9 Fed. Reg. 12,255 (1944)).
13. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 578, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353 (1982)).
14. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982)).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (1982). The statute provides:
A drug or device shall be deemed to be misbranded-(f)Unless its labeling bears
(1) adequate directions for use; and (2) such adequate warnings against use in
those pathological conditions or by children where its use may be dangerous to
health, or against unsafe dosages or methods or duration of administration or ap-
1988]
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the labeling does not bear "adequate directions for use,""6 be-
cause the directions are intended for the user. Prescription
drugs, 1 however, need not bear "adequate directions for use" on
the label going to the user.18 Instead, the label for the user is a
simplified statement, which must bear the words "Caution: Fed-
eral law prohibits dispensing without prescription."19
plication, in such manner and form, as are necessary for the protection of users:
Provided, That where any requirement of clause (1) of this subsection, as applied
to any drug or device, is not necessary for the protection of the public health, the
Secretary shall promulgate regulations exempting such drug or device from such
requirement.
Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 353. A prescription drug is defined as:
(b)(1) A drug intended for use by man which;
(A) is a habit-forming drug to which § 352(d) of this title applies; or
(B) because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method
of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use except
under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug; or
(C) is limited by an approved application under Section 355 of this title to use
under the professional supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer
such drug; shall be dispensed only (i) upon a written prescription of a practitioner
licensed by law to administer such drug, or (ii) upon an oral prescription of such
practitioner which is reduced promptly to writing and filed by the pharmacist, or
(iii) by refilling any such written or oral prescription if such refilling is authorized
by the prescriber either in the original prescription or by oral order which is re-
duced promptly to writing and filed by the pharmacist. The act of dispensing a
drug contrary to the provisions of this paragraph shall be deemed to be an act
which results in the drug being misbranded while held for sale.
Id.
18. Id. Exemptions in case of drugs and devices.
(b) Prescription by physician; exemption from labeling and prescription require-
ments; misbranded drugs; compliance with narcotic and marijuana laws
(2) Any drug dispensed by filling or refilling a written or oral prescription of a
practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug shall be exempt from the
requirements of Section 352 of this title, except subsections (a), (i)(2) and (3), (k),
and (1) of said section, and the packaging requirements of subsections (g), (h), and
(p) of said section, if the drug bears a label containing the name and address of
the dispenser, the serial number and date of the prescription or of its filling, the
name of the prescriber, and, if stated in the prescription, the name of the patient,
and the direction for use and cautionary statements, if any, contained in such
prescription. This exemption shall not apply to any drug dispensed in the course
of the conduct of a business of dispensing drugs pursuant to diagnosis by mail, or
to a drug dispensed in violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection.
Id.
19. Id. § 353 (b)(4). This code section states:
A drug which is subject to paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be deemed to be
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/2
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The directions and warnings for use of a new prescription
drug, which is sold by virtue of an approved New Drug Applica-
tion, 0 are provided to the physician in the form of prescribing
misbranded if at any time prior to dispensing its label fails to bear the statement:
"Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without prescription." A drug to which
paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply shall be deemed to be misbranded
if at any time prior to dispensing its label bears the caution statement quoted in
the preceding sentence.
Id.
20. New Drugs are defined as those drugs which have the following characteristics:
1. Classification as a drug;
2. Absence of general recognition of safety and effectiveness for the drug, a recog-
nition of those attributes among qualified scientists rather than among the public
or all practitioners, or absence of such general recognition as to any particular use
for which it is proposed to be used and prescribed; and
3. Absence of a record of pre-1938 uses for that drug which match identically the
uses for which the drug is now represented to be useful.
J. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION voL. 1, 13-18 (1987) [hereinafter O'REILLYJ.
The 1962 Drug Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), expanded the new
drug definition to include "efficacy." 87th Cong. 2d Sess. Id. at 13-18 n.5.
After 1962, new drugs, as well as new uses for drugs already in use, became subject
to the new drug application (NDA) process whereby they must be approved as safe and
effective for use under the conditions specified on their labels. Id. at 13-19 (citing 21
U.S.C. § 355 (1982)). 21 U.S.C. § 355 states in part:
(a) No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce
any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection
(b) or (j) is effective with respect to such drug.
(b) Any person may file with the Secretary an application with respect to any drug
subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Such person shall submit
to the Secretary as part of the application (1) full reports of investigations which
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether
such drug is effective in use; (2) a full list of the articles used as components of
such drug; (3) a full statement of the composition of such drug; (4) a full descrip-
tion of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufac-
ture, processing, and packing of such drug; (5) such samples of such drug and of
the articles used as components thereof as the Secretary may require; and (6)
specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355 (1982).
There are four main stages in the drug approval procedure. The first stage involves
discovery of a new compound or experimentation with a known one; testing of the com-
pounds in laboratory screening tests and animal studies; and the filing of an Investiga-
tional New Drug (IND) application, giving the FDA an opportunity to examine the pro-
posal for human experimentation with the drug at least 30 days before commencement of
the experimentation. O'REILLY, at 13-58.
The second stage is in preparation of the filing of the New Drug Application (NDA)
and involves meetings between the FDA and the drug firm to examine the IND evidence
to determine if there are any special problems or any additional testing to be done. Id. at
13-59.
The third stage of the approval process consists of clinical studies in which the evi-
5
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information, or package inserts, 1 and are phrased in terms only
intelligible to a physician. The physician must exercise his judg-
ment in determining whether the indications for use exist in the
particular person on the basis of his present condition, his medi-
cal history, and the illness or symptoms to be treated. Only the
physician can decide whether the conditions observed call for
the prescription of the drug. Since, by definition, the prescrip-
tion drug can only be used under the direction of the doctor,
such drugs are exempt from the requirement of adequate direc-
tion for use to the layman.22 The prescribing information, sup-
plied to the physician in the form of package inserts" or in the
dence most critical to approval is developed. Meetings between the FDA and the drug
firm continue throughout this stage for the purpose of reviewing findings. Id. at 13-60.
During the fourth stage, several component groups of the National Center for Drugs
& Biology review the studies and produce recommendations. Questions are raised at
FDA meetings and the drug firm is asked to respond to them. An FDA committee may
suggest additional work that needs to be done. This fourth stage is the final one before
formal acceptance of the NDA. Id.
21. "A package insert is a communication from a [drug] manufacturer to the medi-
cal profession, based on information usually generated or accumulated by the manufac-
turer and reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). It is regulated, ...
comprehensively and meticulously controlled, by the FDA." Cooper, Drug Labeling and
Products Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug Administration, 41 FooD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 233 (1986).
The package insert is regulated in great detail by the FDA. The fundamental re-
quirements are that the inserts: "contain a summary of the essential scientific informa-
tion needed for the safe and effective use of the drug," 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a) (1987); "be
informative and accurate and neither promotional in tone nor false or misleading in any
particular," id. § 201.56(b); "be based whenever possible on data derived from human
experience," id. § 201.56(c); and not contain any "implied claims ... if there is inade-
quate evidence of safety or lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness." Id. The insert
must include basic information regarding the drug, including its description, clinical
pharmacology, indications and use, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, abuse and
dependence, overdosage, dosage and administration, and available dosage forms. Id. §
201.56(d)(1). Where appropriate, the insert may include information regarding animal
pharmacology, animal toxicology, and clinical studies as well. Id. § 201.57(1), (m).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2) (1982).
23. INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING EDUCATION, DRUG LIABILITY LITIGATION 26 (1967).
Package inserts containing the language approved as part of the NDA give "a compre-
hensive discussion of the drug, its usefulness, and of the precautions to be observed in its
use. This brochure contains the approved claims and needed warnings, and serves as the
basis for all allowable advertising and other promotional claims. It is the basic document
that the physician needs to understand the use and the limitations on the administration
of the prescription drug .... It is what the manufacturer is authorized to claim about
the effectiveness of the drug and it contains the warning information that he is required
to present." Id. at 43-44.
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/2
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Physician's Desk Reference (PDR),24 contains specific language
which has had the prior approval of the FDA.2 5
B. Physician as Learned Intermediary Between the Patient
and Pharmaceutical Manufacturer
A drug manufacturer has a duty to provide to the prescrib-
ing physician, and, at times to the treating physician, an ade-
quate warning of the side effects of the drug and any adverse
reactions the drug may produce which are known to the manu-
facturer or should be known, given the level of scientific knowl-
edge at the time the prescription drug is developed.26
With most products, to avoid liability under a warning de-
fect theory, the warning must be communicated to the ultimate
user of the product.2 7 The supplier is responsible for seeing to it
24. The Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR) is published once a year by Medical Ec-
onomics Inc. and contains verbatim reproductions of the FDA approved labeling for
more than 2,000 drug products. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE ii (42d ed. 1988). Thus, the
PDR is a significant source of information regarding the "indications, effects, dosages,
routes, methods, and frequency and duration of administration and any relevant warn-
ings, hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions" of drugs. Id. The infor-
mation is provided to the PDR by the drug manufacturers. Id. To guarantee that the
information be complete, the PDR requires that the manufacturer submit to it the most
recent FDA approved labeling. Yacura, Inside the PDR, TRIAL, June 1984, at 64. During
the course of the year, the PDR publishes supplements making available new or revised
information. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE ii. The PDR does not list every drug, only
those submitted to it for listing by the manufacturers. Yacura, supra, at 64.
25. See supra note 21.
26. Brushwood & Simonsmeier, Drug Information for Patients, 7 JOURNAL OF LEGAL
MEDICINE 279, 283 n.12 (1986) [hereinafter Brushwood]. What constitutes an adequate
warning has been described as follows:
(1) the warning must adequately indicate the scope of the danger; (2) the warning
must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of the harm that could
result from misuse of the drug; (3) the physical aspects of the warning must be
adequate to alert a reasonably prudent person to the danger; (4) a simple directive
warning may be inadequate when it fails to indicate the consequences that might
result from failure to follow it; and, (5) the means to convey the warning must be
adequate.
Id. (citing Richards v. Upjohn Co., 95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (1980); Feldman v. Led-
erle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1985); Mahr v. G.D. Searle and Co., 72 Ill.
App. 3d 540, 390 N.E.2d 1214 (1979)).
27. Id. at 284 n.17 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965)). The Re-
statement provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is
subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel
with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical
7
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that this warning does reach, directly or indirectly, persons
known by the supplier to use the product.2 Although suppliers
can usually rely on intermediaries to transmit warnings to users,
when a highly dangerous product is involved and the supplier
can, without difficulty, warn the user directly, failure to provide
this direct warning may not be justifiable.2
Drugs differ from most other products for two main reasons.
First, prescription drugs are frequently recognized as unavoid-
ably unsafe products. Generally speaking, many drugs which are
necessary for survival or well-being cannot be made any safer
given the present state of human knowledge. Under the Restate-
ment of Torts,30 the manufacturers of these drugs will not be
harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied
will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
28. Brushwood, supra note 26, at 284-85.
29. Id.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). This section on
unavoidably unsafe products provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for
the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and
damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably
leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully
justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve.
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason can-
not legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, be-
cause of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can
be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such expe-
rience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug nothwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualifica-
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known
but apparently reasonable risk.
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/2
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held strictly liable for unfortunate consequences attending their
use if the drugs are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warnings are given.3
Second, it is almost universally recognized that, while the
duty to warn normally extends to the ultimate users of a prod-
uct or to those persons the manufacturer has reason to believe
will be placed at risk by the product, and while patients are the
ones who are the ultimate users of, or put at risk by, prescrip-
tion drugs, the warning regarding these drugs must be given to
the prescribing physician.2 It is the prescribing physician, not
the patient, who is best able to measure the benefits of a drug
against the risks involved in its use.3 3 Thus, a warning to the
medical profession is the most effective method of protecting a
patient against the harmful results of a drug. 4
Courts have, quite properly, characterized the physician as a
"learned intermediary" who is charged with the responsibility of
knowing his patient, being apprised of the effects of the drug
use, and exercising his medical judgment accordingly.35 The very
31. Id.
32. Lawrence, Drug Manufacturer's Recommendations and the Common Knowl-
edge Rule to Establish Medical Malpractice, 63 NEB. L. REV. 859, 862 (1984).
33. Id.
34. Id. In Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971), a prod-
ucts liability action was brought on behalf of a woman who suffered pulmonary embo-
lisms and thrombophlebitis allegedly caused by the drug Enovid, used in treating en-
dometriosis. The court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of Searle and stated:
It is the general rule that the duty of adequate warning by the manufacturer of an
ethical drug is discharged by its warning of hazards to doctors who may in the
exercise of their medical judgments decide to use the drug as part of their chemo-
therapy .... [A]bsent special circumstances, known or foreseeable in the exercise
of due care by the manufacturer, there is no duty to warn the patient.
Id. at 989, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 400 (citation omitted).
The rationale of the foregoing rule is: (1) The doctor is intended to be an
intervening party in the full sense of the word. Medical ethics as well as medical
practice dictate independent judgment, unaffected by the manufacturer's control,
on the part of the doctor. (2) Were the patient to be given the complete and
highly technical information on the adverse possibility associated with the use of
the drug, he would have no way to evaluate it, and in his limited understanding he
might actually object to the drug, thereby jeopardizing his life. (3) It would be
virtually impossible for a manufacturer to comply with the duty of direct warning,
as there is no sure way to reach the patient.
Id. at 989, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01 (quoting Rheingold, Products Liability - The Ethi-
cal Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 987 (1964)).
35. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966). In Cornish, the court
stated:
9
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rationale for warnings, the prevention of injury, dictates the rule
that the manufacturer has only the duty to warn the physician
and it is only by warning the physician that injury can be pre-
vented.3' The patient simply does not have the knowledge or
training to exercise the medical judgment necessary to choose a
prescription drug.
In Terhune v. A. H. Robins Co.,37 the Supreme Court of
Washington held that the "manufacturer of [an intrauterine
contraceptive device] obtainable only through the services of a
physician, fulfills its duty if it warns the physician of the dan-
gers attendant upon its use ... ."38 In Terhune, the plaintiff
brought a products liability action against A. H. Robins for dam-
ages allegedly sustained as a result of the use of a Dalkon Shield,
an intrauterine contraceptive device.39 Specifically, after the
birth of her second child, the plaintiff was informed by her phy-
sician of the advantages and disadvantages of a variety of birth
control methods.4 0 The plaintiff selected the Dalkon Shield, sup-
plied by Robins to physicians only, and not directly to patients,
because of the medical expertise and equipment required for in-
sertion of the Shield.4 1 Robins instructed the physician on the
procedure to be followed in inserting the Shield and warned the
physician of the risks attendant to its use, including the possibil-
ity of perforation of the uterus if insertion procedures were not
adequately followed.' 2 Brochures written for patients describing
[I]n this case we are dealing with a prescription drug rather than a normal
consumer item. In such a case the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary
between the purchaser and the manufacturer. If the doctor is properly warned of
the possibility of a side effect in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms
normally accompanying the side effect, there is an excellent chance that injury to
the patient can be avoided.
Id. at 85.
36. Id. The court found that the drug manufacturer should have warned plaintiff's
doctor of potentially dangerous side effects of Aralen, a drug used in the treatment of
arthritis; Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Mo. 1967) (the court noted
that it is only through a proper warning to the physician that the chance of injury to the
user can be avoided).
37. 90 Wash. 2d 9, 577 P.2d 975 (1978).
38. Id. at 17, 577 P.2d at 979.
39. Id. at 9-10, 577 P.2d at 975.
40. Id. at 10, 577 P.2d at 976.
41. Id.
42. Id.
[Vol. 8:535
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the Shield and highlighting its advantages were supplied to the
physician; the transmission of these brochures to the patient was
left to the physician's discretion. 3 The Terhune court held that
there was no need to warn the patient as well."' The court noted
that "where a product is available only on prescription or
through the services of a physician, the physician acts as a
'learned intermediary' between the manufacturer or seller and
the patient, ', 5 and that the physician has a "duty to inform
himself of the qualities and characteristics of those products
which he prescribes for or administers to or uses on his patients,
and to exercise an independent judgment, taking into account
his knowledge of the patient as well as the product."4 The pa-
tient is expected to rely on that judgment. The physician de-
cides what facts the patient should be told."'
In Chambers v. G. D. Searle & Co.,4 8 the court recognized
the federal statutory basis of the case law rule that the drug
manufacturer's duty was only to warn the physician, the learned
intermediary, of possible side effects of the drug. The case con-
cerned a prescription drug regulated by federal law which could
only be used under the professional supervision of a doctor li-
censed to administer the drug.49 Recognizing the technical na-
ture of drug warnings, the court held that it is quite clear that
43. Id.
44. Id. at 18, 577 P.2d at 979.
45. Id. at 14, 577 P.2d at 978.
46. Id.
47. Id. See, e.g., Johnson v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App. 1969); Oppen-
heimer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 219 N.E.2d 54 (1964); Parke-Davis &
Co. v. Mayes, 124 Ga. App. 224, 183 S.E.2d 410 (1971); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceuti-
cal Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418, 307 A.2d 449 (1973); Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202 (8th
Cir. 1975); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Schenebeck v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); and Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416
F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1968). All of these cases recognized the general rule that in the case of
prescription drugs, the manufacturer can fulfill its duty to warn by warning the medical
profession.
48. 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), afrd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977). The plaintiff
sought recovery for injuries sustained as a result of a stroke which was allegedly caused
by taking oral contraceptives manufactured by the defendant Searle. The court applied
the doctrine of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). Id. at 380.
The court held that the warning given to the physician was adequate and granted de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict. Id. at 384-85.
49. Chambers, 441 F. Supp. at 381.
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the warning which must be examined is that given to the physi-
cian and not that given to the "user" 50 and that "the purchaser's
doctor is [the] learned intermediary between the purchaser and
manufacturer."'51
As these and other cases amply hold, the drug manufac-
turer's duty is to warn the physician, who is a learned intermedi-
ary between the manufacturer and the patient-consumer. 2
Based on his knowledge of the drug from information garnered
from the PDR, package inserts, advertisements, and from per-
50. Id. (quoting Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966)). The
court cited to Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971), which
noted that the doctor is "an intervening party who is required to exercise his own inde-
pendent judgment on the basis of the technical information furnished." Chambers, 441
F. Supp. at 381.
51. Chambers, 441 F. Supp. at 381.
52. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. There are two main exceptions to the
rule that drug manufacturers do not have to directly warn the consumer-patient. A few
recent cases in a select number of jurisdictions have held that a manufacturer of birth
control pills has a common law duty to warn not only the physician, but also the ulti-
mate user, of risks inherent in the use of this particular medication. See Odgers v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (court recognized a common
law duty on part of drug manufacturers to warn user directly of the dangers of the use of
the contraceptive, Ortho-Novum); Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D.
Mich. 1985) (manufacturer of Ovulen 21, birth control pills, had a duty to warn patient
directly of risk of side effects); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass.
131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985) (manufacturer had a duty to warn
user of the potential risk of a stroke when taking Ortho-Novum, an oral contraceptive).
But cf. In re Certified Questions, 419 Mich. 686, 358 N.W.2d 873 (1984) (in absence of
action by legislature, there is no rule of law relating to a manufacturer's duty to warn
patients directly of the dangers of use of the contraceptive, Ortho-Novum).
The distinction between oral contraceptives and other prescription drugs is based
on three points: (1) for oral contraceptives, patient choice plays a much more
prominent role than in the case of drugs prescribed for the treatment of illness or
injury; (2) as the result of manufacturer generated publicity, patients eager to take
the pill have specifically requested it as the most effective means of preventing
unwanted pregnancies; and (3) physicians usually do not supervise the use of oral
contraceptives, as they do the use of other drugs.
Brushwood, supra note 14, at 291-92 (citing the dissent in In re Certified Questions).
In two polio vaccine cases, Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968)
where the plaintiff was given polio vaccine in a mass immunization clinic, and Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), where
the plaintiff received polio vaccines at a county health clinic, the courts ruled that when
a manufacturer of a prescription drug knows or has reason to know that the drug will be
dispensed or administered without a physician present to weigh the risk versus the bene-
fit of a particular patient using the drug, the manufacturer must provide the consumer
with adequate information to do his or her own balancing of the risks and benefits of
using that drug.
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/2
MISUSE DEFENSE
sonal knowledge, and based on his knowledge of his patient, the
physician decides whether to prescribe the drug in question.
Regrettably, the use of some drugs results in an adverse re-
action in some patients, and as a result, some of these patients
bring lawsuits against the drug manufacturer. In many of these
actions, the drug in question qualifies as a Comment k product"
in which the manufacturer has issued complete and adequate
warnings,"4 but the prescribing physician misused the drug.
III. Misuse of Prescription Drugs by the Physician
A proper warning by a drug manufacturer is useless unless
the physician reads and follows it.15 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts states that "[w]here warning is given, the seller may
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a prod-
uct bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed,
is not in a defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous."56
Under products liability law, failure to follow adequate in-
structions is considered misuse which bars a plaintiff's recov-
ery.5 7 Physicians have the duty to read the drug manufacturers'
warnings, and with those exceptions necessitated by the individ-
ual patient's needs, adhere to them. When a patient suffers in-
jury or death because the physician has ignored the drug's label-
ing, then the physician's misuse of the product serves as the
intervening cause of any injury which may result to the patient.
Misuse of a drug by a physician occurs either when the physi-
cian prescribes the medication without reading the directions or
when he reads the directions but ignores them.
53. See supra note 48.
54. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
55. Lawrence, Drug Manufacturer's Recommendation and the Common Knowledge
Rule to Establish Medical Malpractice, 63 Nma. L. REV. 859, 864 (1984).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
57. Pinto v. Clairol, Inc., 324 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1963) (plaintiff who failed to
take a patch test before dyeing her hair as package instructed was barred from recovery);
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (plaintiff's
"violation of the plain instructions and warnings was a misuse of [the product] and con-
stitutes a defense to the cause of action").
1988]
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A. Failure to Follow Directions
In Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories,5 8 the court affirmed a jury
verdict 59 in favor of a pharmaceutical company in a suit for the
wrongful death of Tarance Magee due to the administration
of the prescription drug Sparine. Mr. Magee, who was suffering
from emotional depression, entered Las Encinas Sanitarium on
October 7, 1958. Between that date and November 17, 1958,
when he died, he was administered Sparine6 0 During that pe-
riod, Mr. Magee contracted a blood disorder-agranulocytosis -
which depletes white corpuscles and hinders the body's ability
to fight infection. 1 The court addressed the issue of proximate
cause insofar as the drug manufacturer's warnings and actions
were concerned. During the trial, one of the physician defend-
ants testified that he read the direction sheet and literature left
by Wyeth Laboratories and that he knew, prior to Mr. Magee's
death, that rare individuals might be sensitive to the drug in
question and that death might result in such individuals.2 The
evidence warranted an inference of negligence on the part of the
prescribing physician who failed to follow directions (emanating
from the manufacturer) although all of them were known to
him. Neither the physician nor the plaintiffs questioned the ade-
quacy of the warning.
The court held that a "[flailure to follow an unchallenged
method of use prescribed by the manufacturer constitutes a
break in causation which exonerates the manufacturer from any
58. 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963). A wrongful death action was
brought by a widow and her children against Wyeth Laboratories for the wrongful death
of her husband caused by the administration of Sparine, a drug used to treat depression.
Id. at 344, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 324. Mrs. Magee and her children sued on the theories of
negligence and implied warranty. Id. at 347, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
59. Id. at 359, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 333. The plaintiff named Las Encinas Sanitarium,
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., seven doctors, and nine nurses as defendants. Before trial,
however, all defendants except Wyeth Laboratories settled. Id. at 344, 29 Cal. Rptr. at
324.
60. Id. at 344-45, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
61. Id. at 345, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
62. Id. at 345, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 325. The doctor was also familiar with the portion of
the document which stated, "Agranulocytosis has occurred in 18 instances from some 3
1/2 million patients who have received the drug. Patients should be observed frequently
and asked to report immediately any sudden appearance of any signs of infection ... 
Id. at 346, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
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liability."' s Furthermore, "[t]he intervention of such negligence
of the doctor is not a foreseeable consequence of the sale of the
drug within the narrow field in and for which it was distrib-
uted. '6 4 The court went on to note that the warranty does not
run to a person who cannot reasonably be expected to use the
drug; similarly, one who fails to follow adequate manufacturer's
warnings is not within the warranty."' Thus, by providing ade-
quate warnings to reasonably foreseeable users, the manufac-
turer protects itself from liability under the warranty.6
In Mulder v. Parke-Davis & Co., 7 the court cited Magee to
support affirmance of a lower court's decision to grant Parke-
Davis' motion for a directed verdict." In Mulder, the plaintiff
brought a wrongful death action claiming Parke-Davis was negli-
gent in failing to give adequate warnings6 9 to the medical profes-
63. Id. at 351-52, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
64. Id. at 349, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
65. Id. at 350, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28.
66. Id. at 350, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28 (citing Nishida v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 245 F.2d 768, 774 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958)). The court
stated:
The manufacturer is at least entitled to assume that his product will be put to
a normal use; and he is not subject to liability where it would ordinarily be safe,
but injury results because it is mishandled, or is used in some unusual or unfore-
seeable way .... In the ordinary case the maker may also assume a normal user;
and he is not liable where the injury is due to some allergy or other personal
idiosyncrasy of the consumer, found only in an insignificant percentage of the
population. But if the allergy is one common to any substantial number of possi-
ble users, the seller may be required at least to give warning of the danger.
Id. at 352, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (citation omitted).
67. 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970). Plaintiff's widower brought a wrongful
death action against Parke-Davis, the manufacturer of the antibiotic Chloromycetin and
the prescribing physician, Frank E. Mork. Id. at 333, 181 N.W.2d at 884.
68. Id. The supreme court affirmed the directed verdict as to the manufacturer, but
ordered a new trial as to the physician, holding that evidence that the manufacturer's
instructions were not followed and that failure to do so resulted in patient's death was
sufficient to make out a prima facie case of liability. Id. at 339, 181 N.W.2d at 887.
69. Id. at 334, 181 N.W.2d at 884. The warning which Parke-Davis gave is as
follows:
Serious and even fatal blood dyscrasias (aplastic anemia, hypoplastic anemia,
thrombocytopenia, granulocytopenia) are known to occur after the administration
of chloramphenicol. Blood dyscrasias have occurred after both short-term and
prolonged therapy with this drug. Bearing in mind the possibility that such reac-
tions may occur, chloramphenicol should be used only for serious infections
caused by organisms which are susceptible to its antibacterial effects. Chloram-
phenicol should not be used when other less potentially dangerous agents will be
effective, or in the treatment of trivial infections such as colds, influenza, or viral
15
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sion about the dangers of Chloromycetin, an antibiotic manufac-
tured and marketed by Parke-Davis. Specifically, on June 24,
1965, the decedent, the plaintiff's wife, had consulted defendant
Dr. Frank E. Mork for an infection in her left ear."0 She was
treated with penicillin but her condition did not improve and
she returned to the doctor four days later when her condition
was diagnosed as purulent otitis media.7' Dr. Mork took a cul-
ture, tested it with fifteen antibiotics and found the most effec-
tive to be Chloromycetin.7 2 He then prescribed one 250-milli-
gram capsule four times daily for four days." Since Mrs.
Mulder's condition improved, the prescription was renewed."'
However, on September 22, examination by a different doctor
revealed a worsening of Mrs. Mulder's otitis, and the Chloro-
mycetin prescription was renewed again."' The same treatment
was prescribed by Dr. Mork three days later, following a hemo-
globin test, and was renewed, once more, a week later.76 On Jan-
uary 10, 1966, Dr. Mork discovered that Mrs. Mulder had been
hemorrhaging in her arms, legs, and breast.17 She died on Janu-
ary 29, 1966, from gastrointestinal hemorrhage due to aplastic
anemia or bone marrow depression. 8 In addition to allegations
that the defendant drug company's warning was inadequate, the
plaintiffs also claimed that the warning did not come to the doc-
tor's attention.7
infections of the throat, or as a prophylactic agent.
Precautions: It is essential that adequate blood studies be made during treat-
ment with the drug. While blood studies may detect early peripheral blood
changes such as leukopenia or granulocytopenia, before they become irreversible,
such studies cannot be relied on to detect bone marrow depression prior to devel-
opment of aplastic anemia.
Id. at 334-35, 181 N.W.2d at 884-85.
Plaintiffs asserted that Parke-Davis' "so-called detail men who called on doctors,
failed to mention dosage[s], length of therapy, level of concentration of the drug in the
blood, or side effects of the drug." Id. at 334, 181 N.W. 2d at 884.
70. Id. at 333, 181 N.W.2d at 884.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 333-34, 181 N.W.2d at 884.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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In its affirmation of the directed verdict, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court noted that the doctor had testified that he was
aware of the side effects and possible complications in the use of
Chloromycetin, one of which was the dyscrasia, an imbalance of
components in the blood, experienced by Mrs. Mulder."° Citing
to Magee, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that where the
only issue is failure to communicate a warning, the manufacturer
is not liable if the doctor was fully aware of the facts which were
the subject of the warning.81 Again the court held that "[flailure
[of the doctor] to follow an unchallenged method of use pre-
scribed by the manufacturer constitutes a break in the chain of
causation .... "82
In Love v. Wolf,8 3 an earlier Chloromycetin case in another
jurisdiction, the California Court of Appeals reversed a judg-
ment for the plaintiffs due to the lawyer's trial misconduct,84 but
refused to grant Parke-Davis' motion for a directed verdict. s5
The court in Wolf acknowledged the doctrine stated in Magee
that a drug company has no duty to insure that the warning
reaches the doctor's patient for whom the drug is prescribed."0
The court also noted that Parke-Davis87 warned about the side
80. Id. at 335, 181 N.W.2d at 885.
81. Id. (citing Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 351, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322, 328 (1963)).
82. Id. at 336, 181 N.W.2d at 885 (citing Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal.
App. 2d 340, 351, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 328 (1963)).
83. 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964). The plaintiff recovered $334,046
in damages for severe anemia which plaintiff suffered after taking the antibiotic, Chloro-
mycetin, prescribed for her by Dr. Wolf and manufactured by Parke-Davis and Com-
pany. Id. at 382, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
84. Id. at 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
Misconduct by the plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Boccardo, permeated the proceed-
ings. Counsel selected as his principle target Parke-Davis. Typical is the assertion
in the opening statement that after Parke-Davis "started to use this stuff all over
the country came reports of people dying from it, people suffering from aplastic
anemia and dying." Later in the trial, counsel referred to Chloromycetin as a
"death-dealing drug." He also stated: "[T]here isn't a bigger con outfit in the
world than Parke-Davis, and I will prove it before I get through with this case."
Id. Finally, in closing arguments, Mr. Boccardo compared Parke-Davis and Dr. Wolf to
Fagin and Oliver Twist and later to a "gangster and his gunman." Id. at 386, 38 Cal.
Rptr. at 187.
85. Id. at 382, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
86. Id. at 402-03, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
87. In 1952, following an investigation by the FDA, a cautionary warning for circu-
lars, packages, and labels was prescribed. The following warning was to appear at the top
17
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effects of Chloromycetin and that Dr. Wolf knew of the dangers
attendant with the use of Chloromycetin.as However, in its deci-
sion not to order a nonsuit, the court recognized the plaintiff's
legal contention that a "proper warning ... given [to] Dr. Wolf
and the rest of the medical profession .. . [is] cancelled out if
overpromotion through a vigorous sales program persuaded doc-
tors to disregard the warnings given."8 9
The court took note of the large sales figures for Chloro-
mycetin90 and the fact that the use of the drug had not been
limited to the treatment of typhus, typhoid, Rocky Mountain fe-
ver, and other infections to which the plaintiff's experts asserted
of the circular:
"Certain blood dyscrasias (aplastic anemia, thrombocytopenic purpura, granulocytopenia
and pancytopenia) have been associated with the administration of Chloromycetin. It is
essential that adequate blood studies be made when prolonged or intermittent adminis-
tration of this drug is required. Chloromycetin should not be used indiscriminately or for
minor infections." Id. at 383, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 185. The FDA also prescribed the following
warning which was to be included on the label: "WARNING: Blood dyscrasias may be
associated with intermittent or prolonged use and it is essential that adequate blood
studies be made." Id.
These directives were immediately complied with by Parke-Davis. Id., 38 Cal. Rptr.
at 185. Also, on July 7, 1952, Parke-Davis sent letters to 200,000 physicians advising
them of the association between Chloromycetin and aplastic anemia and stating that
while the number of cases was unknown, "many have terminated fatally." Id. In particu-
lar, Parke-Davis called attention to the danger resulting from intermittent or indiscrimi-
nate treatment. Id. at 383-84, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 185. These letters were supplemented by
full page announcements in the American Medical Association Journal. Id. at 384, 38
Cal. Rptr. at 185.
88. Id. at 395-96, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 193. The court stated that "Dr. Wolf knew of the
potential danger: (1) from the warnings from labels and packages received by him and
from the advertising literature and letters received from Parke-Davis; (2) also from stud-
ies made in medical school and in special research during his internship, and (3) from
articles in professional magazines." Id.
89. Id. at 396, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 193. The court took the position that Parke-Davis
"played down" the dangers of Chloromycetin. Id. at 398, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 195. It pointed
to advertisements which included such statements as "[m]ore than 11,000,000 patients
have been treated with this important antibiotic" and "[tiruly one of the world's out-
standing therapeutic agents." Id. The advertisements also stated, "[a] review of the liter-
ature points up the fact that the great majority of investigators who study this drug
clinically report no evidence of untoward reactions. Side effects occur infrequently with
Chloromycetin and, when encountered, are generally.., mild for this type of therapy."
Id. Another advertisement quoted from an unnamed article which stated, "[i]n no case
have we seen any evidence of depression of the hemopoietic system resulting in aplastic
anemia or agranulocytosis. We are now certain that Chloromycetin is effective with very
minimal untoward side effects." Id.
90. Id. In 1961, $68,000,000 of Parke-Davis' total gross sales of $190,000,000 came
from the sale of Chloromycetin. Id.
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its use to be limited."e
There are troubling aspects to the court's position that facts
indicative of "overpromotion" prevent a directed verdict. As the
court itself noted, Dr. Wolf was fully cognizant of the dangers
inherent in the use of Chloromycetin 2 Since he knew of the
dangers of the drug he was prescribing, the court's reliance on
Parke-Davis' "overpromotion" of Chloromycetin to deny a non-
suit was unfounded."
Love v. Wolf is just one example of a court's failure to rec-
ognize the misuse defense in drug liability cases." If a physician
was fully aware of the dangers and warnings of a drug, then the
alleged "overpromotion" of that drug is irrelevant.
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Formella v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp.9 5 took a different position from the court in Wolf when it
held that the negligence of the physician was the intervening,
independent, sole proximate cause of a patient's injuries when
she developed aplastic anemia as a direct result of taking the
drug, even if the manufacturer had been negligent in over-
promoting use of the drug. In Formella, the plaintiff, who had
complained of lower back pain, was diagnosed as having osteoar-
thritis and was prescribed Tandearil by Dr. Murguz 96 She re-
turned to Dr. Murguz' office two weeks later, at which time he
continued the drug treatment.97 Dr. Murguz did not perform any
blood tests at any time during her treatment. 8 Several weeks
91. Id. at 398-99, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
92. See supra note 88.
93. 226 Cal. App. at 402, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 197. The concept of overpromotion is itself
a dubious one. A pharmaceutical company is a "for profit company"; it is in business to
make money. A doctor who chooses to misuse the drug should not blame the drug manu-
facturer's successful marketing of the drug for that misuse.
94. See, e.g., Richards v. Upjohn, 95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (1980) (holding that
the treating physician's failure to consult the PDR, which contained the manufacturer's
warnings, and the resulting misuse of the product were foreseeable, thereby precluding a
summary judgment). See also infra note 101 and accompanying text.
95. 100 Mich. App. 649, 300 N.W.2d 356 (1980). Helen Formella and her husband
brought an action against the prescribing physician, Dr. Murguz, and the Ciba-Geigy
Corporation. They alleged that as a result of taking Tandearil for lower back pain caused
by osteoarthritis, Mrs. Formella suffered aplastic anemia. Id. at 651-52, 300 N.W.2d at
357. The Formellas alleged that Ciba-Geigy failed to adequately warn physicians of the
dangers of Tandearil and overpromoted its use. Id. at 652, 300 N.W.2d at 357.
96. Id. at 652, 300 N.W.2d at 357.
97. Id.
98. Id.
1988]
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later, Mrs. Formella complained to Dr. Murguz of multiple
bruises and tiredness.9 9 Dr. Murguz stated that he suspected
that Tandearil had caused Mrs. Formella to develop aplastic
anemia. Hospital tests confirmed Dr. Murguz' suspicions.' 0
The court in Formella quite properly recognized that over-
promotion is a side issue and irrelevant when the prescribing
physician knows of the dangerous side effects of a drug. 1' The
physician, being the skilled, learned intermediary, has the re-
sponsibility to read and follow the warnings when prescribing a
medication and not to rely on sales promotions.
It is the very hazards of prescription medicines that require
a doctor's authorization for a patient to purchase and receive
them. Otherwise, there would be no need for prescription medi-
cations and salesmen could promote these medicines directly to
the public. To blame the malfeasance of a physician who failed
to follow directions when prescribing the medications on "over-
promotion" by the drug manufacturers violates the very spirit of
the FDA regulations.
Other cases have continued to hold that a physician's failure
to follow a drug manufacturer's directions for use serves as the
intervening, independent and sole proximate cause of a patient's
injuries. In Dyer v. Best Pharmacal,02 the plaintiff, Betty Dyer,
was given an intramuscular injection of NOL-LA, an anorexiant
drug, as a treatment for weight control.103 She was hospitalized
the following day with a diagnosis of subarachnoid hemor-
rhage.10 4 She was comatose for several weeks and developed car-
diovascular complications.'0 5
The drug, NOL-LA, was sent directly to the physician, Dr.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 653, 300 N.W.2d at 357-58. The court in Formella stated that there was
no evidence that the drug was overpromoted. Id. at 654, 300 N.W.2d at 358. Dr. Murguz
stated that he was told by detail men that the drug was good "with a safety margin." Id.
The court noted "although some of the early literature tends to play down the possible
side effects of the drug and recommends its use for extended periods of time, all of the
literature submitted to this court includes a warning that blood tests should be fre-
quently conducted on the patient." Id.
102. 118 Ariz. 465, 577 P.2d 1084 (1978).
103. Id. at 466, 577 P.2d at 1085.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Augustus Stewart, from Best Pharmacal and was accompanied
by a package insert. The package insert recommended the drug
as an anorexiant for weight control, but also listed hypertension
and cardiovascular disease as contraindications of the drug's
use. lo6
The court declined to find Best Pharmacal guilty of negli-
gence per se for failing to file a New Drug Application.1 07 In-
stead, the court examined the legal theories of successive and
concurrent causes of an event 0 s and found that the successive
act of the physician in prescribing the drug NOL-LA, an anorex-
iant, to Mrs. Dyer served as the proximate cause of her inju-
ries.10 9 The court found that the drug manufacturer could not be
"required legally to foresee that a licensed physician [would]
disregard express warnings regarding a drug's use.'' O
The importance of Dyer lies not merely in the reiteration of
Magee and its legal progeny, but also in the court's recognition
of the fact that the drug manufacturer cannot insure against the
prescribing physician disregarding the drug manufacturer's
106. Id.
107. Id. at 467, 577 P.2d at 1086. The court stated:
It is true that a person who violates a statute enacted for the protection and safety
of the public is guilty of negligence per se. Even assuming for the purposes of
review that Mrs. Dyer is one of the class that can raise the effect of non-compli-
ance with the FDCA, appellants still have failed to explain exactly how the appel-
lee's alleged violation of the FDCA by their failure to file a New Drug Application
resulted in Mrs. Dyer's injuries ....
Id.
108. Id. The court in Dyer held that "when two forces combine to produce an in-
jury, they are labeled either concurrent or successive causes. If the forces are concurrent,
both or either may be the proximate cause of the injury. If the two forces are successive,
only the most immediate is the proximate cause of the injury." Id. Citing to Lyric
Amusement Co. v. Jeffries, 58 Ariz. 381, 388, 120 P.2d 417, 420 (1941), the Dyer court
stated:
The difference between concurrent and successive causes may be stated as follows:
If two distinct causes are operating at the same time to produce a given result
which might be produced by either alone they are concurrent, but if they are suc-
cessive and unrelated in their operation, they cannot be concurrent, and one must
be the proximate and one the remote cause. In such a case the proximate is the
responsible cause and the law disregards the remote one.
Id.
109. Id. at 468, 577 P.2d at 1087. The court noted there were cases when the rule
governing concurrent forces applies to successive causes of an injury. In those cases, the
defendant's negligent course of conduct has ended and only the risk of harm created by
the negligent conduct is present at the time of the injury. Id. at 468, 577 P.2d at 1087.
110. Id. at 469, 577 P.2d at 1088.
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warnings. To require the drug manufacturer to be liable for a
physician's possible failings would force the manufacturer into
becoming, in effect, a health care insurer, an untenable legal and
financial position for the company.
In Beyette v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,"' the plaintiff
Rene Beyette alleged that Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (Ortho)
had failed to warn her about the increased risk of infection asso-
ciated with the use of its intrauterine birth control device (IUD)
known as the Lippes Loop." 2 Mrs. Beyette also claimed that
Ortho had breached the express warranties of product safety
contained in its product information sheet."3
The physician, Dr. Kaufman, had originally inserted the
IUD in 1972.1" But prior to inserting the IUD, he had consulted
the accompanying product information sheet. 1 5 Under the "side
effects" heading, the product information sheet explained that
twenty-three out of 1,673 patients fitted with the Lippes Loop
were tentatively diagnosed as having a history of pelvic inflam-
matory disease.""
After the plaintiff had the IUD removed and replaced twice,
Dr. Kaufman inserted a third Lippes Loop in 1975. In 1977, fol-
lowing a directive from the FDA, Ortho changed its warning to
include a reference to the reported increased risk of pelvic infec-
111. 823 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at 992. Defendant-appellant, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation (Ortho),
appealed from a judgment for plaintiffs-appellees, Rene Beyette and her husband Ron-
ald Beyette, entered pursuant to a jury verdict in a diversity action for personal injuries.
Id. at 990.
113. Id. at 992.
114. Id. at 991.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 991 n.2. The product information sheet stated:
Lippes reported 23 patients with tentative diagnoses or histories of pelvic inflam-
matory disease among 1,673 patients fitted with LIPPES Loop Intrauterine Double-
S. Of these 23, the tentative diagnosis was unsupported by laboratory corrobora-
tion in 8; 3 were found to have urinary tract infections; 1 had appendicitis; 1 had
regional iletis [sic]; and 1 had postoperative wound infection with septicemia fol-
lowing a posterior colporraphy.
The remaining 9 cases recovered promptly; in half of these cases, the device was
not removed.
The base line rate of pelvic inflammatory disease in the population studied is not
available. It is estimated that the rate reported with LIPPEs Loop Intrauterine
Double-S in place is essentially that which would have occurred without it.
[Vol. 8:535
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tion.1"' In a letter dated November 7, 1977, Ortho advised Dr.
Kaufman of the revised product literature.'" 8 The revised warn-
ing stated that "[u]se of an IUD in those patients with cervicitis
should be postponed until treatment has cured the infection." ' 9
On July 24, 1978, Dr. Kaufman discovered that Mrs.
Beyette had a severe cervical infection.12 ° The IUD was not re-
moved until a year later, at which time Mrs. Beyette, in critical
condition, required a total abdominal hysterectomy. 2 '
Dr. Kaufman testified that by December 1977, he realized
that there had been a change in the package insert accompany-
ing the Loop.1 22 He conceded, however, that he had not notified
Mrs. Beyette of the changes.1 23 Mrs. Beyette testified at trial
that had she been advised of the revised warning, she would
have requested the removal of the IUD. 24
The court of appeals overturned the jury verdict,1 25 holding
that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict on Mrs.
Beyette's cause of action charging a failure to warn of the poten-
tial hazards associated with use of the Lippes Loop. 26 The court
reiterated the following legal doctrine:
A manufacturer has a continuing duty to warn the medical pro-
fession, not the patient, of any risks inherent in the use of the
product which the manufacturer knows or should know to exist. A
manufacturer has a continuing duty to inspect and test its prod-
uct during the course of manufacture and to warn the medical
profession of any side effects associated with the product's use.127
The court concluded, however, that Ortho's failure to warn
117. Id. at 991.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 992.
121. Id. at 991.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 991-92.
125. Id. at 992. The jury "returned a verdict of $500,000 in favor of Beyette and
$63,000 in favor of her husband." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 88, 273 N.W.2d
476, 479 (1979); Muilenberg v. Upjohn Co., 115 Mich. App. 316, 331, 320 N.W.2d 358,
366 (1982); Taylor v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 139 Mich. App. 389, 395, 362 N.W.2d 293,
296 (1984)).
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of the increased risk of infection associated with the Lippes
Loop prior to the insertion of Mrs. Beyette's third Loop in 1975
was not the proximate cause of her injuries.128 The product liter-
ature issued by Ortho in 1977 included a warning that there was
a significant risk of pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) associated
with the use of IUDs.129 Based on Dr. Kaufman's knowledge by
December 1977 that the product literature had been modified to
include warnings of the increased risk of PID and his failure
both to inform Mrs. Beyette of the increased risks and to re-
move the Loop under a diagnosis of "severe cervicitis," the court
concluded that Ortho's failure to issue adequate warnings prior
to the insertion of Mrs. Beyette's third Lippes Loop was not the
proximate cause of her injuries.1 30
The court in Beyette accepted the plaintiff's argument that
the pre-1977 product literature for the Lippes Loop was inade-
quate. 13 1 The court, however, recognized that once the physician
has knowledge of the new warnings in the package insert, it be-
comes his responsibility to follow those instructions. 13 The logic
behind this ruling is inarguable. A pharmaceutical manufacturer
abides by the FDA laws and regulations. Upon orders of the
FDA, the manufacturer changes its warnings in the package in-
serts and in the PDR. Once the physician has notice of these
changes, it is his responsibility to prescribe the medication or
product accordingly. The pharmaceutical manufacturer cannot
stand over the physician every time he prescribes a drug. The
position of the drug manufacturer can be analogized to that of
the automobile manufacturer who is not responsible for an acci-
dent caused by an individual who buys a car and then runs a red
light.
B. A Physician's Failure to Read a Drug Manufacturer's
Warnings
When a physician reads a manufacturer's warning and fails
to heed it, the plaintiff and a co-defendant physician may raise
128. Id. at 993.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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the issue of the adequacy'33 of the warning. Often, the drug
company can overcome this issue by introducing into evidence a
physician's affidavit,"" or by merely illustrating the forcefulness
of the warning.135 Sometimes, however, the drug manufacturer is
absolved of liability because the physician failed to consult the
PDR, the package insert, or any other warning or instruction
before prescribing the drug.
In Douglas v. Bussabarger,3 an action in damages for per-
sonal injuries brought against a physician and Sterling Drug, the
plaintiff questioned whether Sterling was negligent in not plac-
ing a warning label on an anesthetic drug container." 7 After
stomach surgery, the plaintiff suffered an impairment of the
functioning of her right foot, bowels and bladder.' 38 Sterling
Drug had supplied some of the anesthetic used in the surgery.
3 9
The jury returned a verdict in favor of both Sterling and the
physician, Dr. Bussabarger, and the plaintiff appealed." 0
The court found that certain trial errors entitled plaintiff to
a new trial as to Dr. Bussabarger. However, the court found that
the correctness or purity of the anesthetic had not been brought
into question."' Furthermore, Dr. Bussabarger had testified that
he had not read the labeling on the anesthetic container but had
relied on his own knowledge of anesthetics. The court concluded
that if Sterling Drug was negligent in not placing a warning on
the anesthetic container, the plaintiff's injury was not proxi-
mately caused by this negligence." 2
By ruling in favor of Sterling Drug, the court in Bus-
sabarger implicitly recognized that no warning is of any use
when the physician fails to read it. The adequacy of the warning
simply becomes irrelevant to the issue of the proximate cause. If
a drug manufacturer's warning is insufficient, the prescribing
133. See supra note 26.
134. See, e.g., Wooten v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471 F. Supp. 546 (D. Conn. 1978).
135. See supra note 26.
136. 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968).
137. Id. at 478, 438 P.2d at 831.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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doctor's knowledge of the drug's character can be a sufficient in-
tervening act to absolve the manufacturer of any liability for
failure to render an adequate warning. 14 3
In Oppenheimer v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,' the court, in its
discussion of the possible negligence of the drug manufacturer in
failing to give adequate warnings, noted that there was nothing
to indicate that the treating physician relied upon any informa-
tion furnished by Sterling Drug in prescribing the medication
for his patient.'45 The court subsequently upheld a directed ver-
dict for the drug manufacturer. In rendering its decision, the
court noted that the "[p]laintiff's doctor failed to observe the
warnings set out in the Physicians' Desk Reference, if he ever
saw them.""'
143. See also, Wolfgruber v. Upjohn, 72 A.D.2d 59, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95 (4th Dep't
1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 768, 417 N.E.2d 1002, 436 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1980) (physician who
treated himself with antibiotic in disregard of manufacturer's adequate warning of dan-
gers, had no basis for suit against manufacturer).
144. 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 219 N.E.2d 54 (1964). The plaintiff consulted Dr. James
McCreary concerning a skin disorder. After receiving a lab report, the doctor prescribed
chloroquine. Although the legend on the prescription indicated that the prescription was
refillable for six months from the date of the original prescription, the prescription was
refilled over a period of more than two years. Id. at 104, 219 N.E.2d at 55-56. Subse-
quently, the plaintiff visited Dr. William Havener, an opthalmologist, and revealed to the
doctor the nature of her skin disorder, lupus discoid erythematosis, and the fact that she
had been treated for the disorder with cortisal steroids and chloroquine. Id. at 104, 219
N.E.2d at 56. Dr. Havener found the plaintiff to have a marked loss in her field of vision,
and diagnosed the cause as chloroquine retinopathy. Id. at 104-05, 219 N.E.2d at 56.
The plaintiff alleged that Aralen, or chloroquine phosphate, was a harmful product,
although distributed as an effective, safe treatment for chronic discoid lupus er-
ythematosis, and its use caused the damage to and loss of vision in her eyes. Id. at 105,
219 N.E.2d at 56. She alleged that defendant was negligent in selling the harmful prod-
uct, in failing to discover the defects in the preparation, and in failing to warn the plain-
tiff of its harmful effects. She further claimed that such negligence [was] the cause of her
loss of vision and permanent damage to her eyes. In addition to the negligence claim,
plaintiff also alleged that the defendant breached its express warranty and an implied
warranty of fitness for use which ran with the product. Id.
145. The court stated:
In the record before us, there is nothing to indicate that the doctor relied upon
any information furnished by the defendant in prescribing Aralen for his patient,
the plaintiff herein, even though he did say that he relied upon [the] Physicians'
Desk Reference and drug company literature. The doctor later specifically
said - "I don't recall specifically reading the precautions" - when referring to
plaintiff's exhibit No. 3. He said, further, that he did not know it, Aralen, to be a
prescription drug, and that in the use of it he relied upon his own experience ....
Id. at 108, 219 N.E.2d at 59.
146. Id. at 109, 219 N.E.2d at 59 (emphasis added). The court stated:
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As part of her argument, the plaintiff in Oppenheimer al-
leged that the defendant had breached an express warranty and
that an implied warranty of fitness for use ran with the prod-
uct.1, 7 The court disposed of these arguments by noting that
even if the defendant had failed in its duty to the plaintiff by
reason of any erroneous publication, the record was completely
silent as to any reliance on those warranties on the part of the
plaintiff's doctor.1, 8
Not all courts accept the doctrine that a treating physician's
misuse of a drug due to a failure to consult a drug manufac-
turer's warnings constitutes an intervening act. In Richards v.
Upjohn,l 9 an action was brought to recover for deafness alleg-
edly resulting from medical treatment with the drug neomycin
sulfate. It was held that the treating physician's failure to con-
sult the PDR, which contained the manufacturer's warnings, and
the resulting misuse of the drug were foreseeable, thereby pre-
[The doctor's] recollection was not clear as to the readings in [the] Physicians'
Desk Reference and defendant's literature circulated to physicians and druggists.
It can hardly be said that he relied upon anything produced by the defendant or
found in the general literature.
Id.
147. Id. at 105, 219 N.E.2d at 56.
148. Id. at 110, 219 N.E.2d at 59. Since the record failed to disclose any reliance by
the plaintiff upon anything published or said by defendant, there cannot be a successful
claim for breach of warranty, either express or implied, as to that plaintiff. Id.
149. 95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (1980). The plaintiff brought an action against a
drug manufacturer for deafness which allegedly resulted from application of the antibi-
otic neomycin sulfate to a leg wound over a three day period.
Upjohn had published warnings in the Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR) and
in the package inserts of the neomycin sulfate it sold that the drug was ototoxic
(toxic to the nerve controlling hearing) and nephrotoxic (toxic to the kidneys), and
could cause deafness. The 1971 PDR indicated that the drug could be used topi-
cally and stated that "[n]eomycin sulfate ... may be used effectively as wet dress-
ings, packs, or irrigations in secondarily infected wounds .... " The warning
stated that "[iln patients with impaired kidney function or with prerenal
azotemia, systemic use of neomycin sulfate may result in irreversible deafness
. .. Id. During and after 1971, Upjohn withdrew its recommendation for any
uses other than intramuscular, apparently after the National Academy of Scien-
tists - National Research Council and the Food and Drug Administration had
determined the drug was probably not effective for topical use and/or as an irriga-
tion solution for open wounds. The 1972 and 1973 PDRs indicated the drug was
for intramuscular use only. Neomycin sulfate had been on the market and used
topically for many years prior to 1971.
Id. at 677, 625 P.2d at 1194.
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cluding summary judgment for the manufacturer. 150 The court
found that when the doctor's act was reasonably foreseeable,' 51
it could not constitute an independent intervening cause as a
matter of law." 2
The issue as framed by the court was whether the physi-
cian's use of the antibiotic neomycin sulfate in an irrigation so-
lution was reasonably foreseeable by Upjohn.153 Upjohn argued
that the negligence of the physician in failing to consult the
most recent PDRs concerning neomycin sulfate insulated
Upjohn from liability.154
The court disagreed and noted that the plaintiffs had
presented evidence that the physician's use of neomycin sulfate
in an irrigation solution was reasonably foreseeable, since the
1971 PDR indicated that the drug could be used topically in irri-
gating wounds. 55 The court rejected the holdings of Oppen-
heimer and Bussabarger which held that the inadequacy of a
drug company's warnings cannot be the proximate cause of the
patient's injury when the physician fails to consult the literature
or observe the warnings concerning the drug he used.156 Instead,
the court held that when a drug company's warnings are inade-
150. Id. at 680, 625 P.2d at 1198.
151. Id. at 679, 625 P.2d at 1196. The court cited the definition of an independent
intervening cause set out in Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 411-12, 285 P.2d 507,
514 (1955), where the New Mexico Supreme Court wrote:
The independent intervening cause that will prevent a recovery of the act or omis-
sion of a wrongdoer must be a cause which interrupts the natural sequence of
events, turns aside their cause, prevents the natural and probable results of the
original act or omission, and produces a different result, that could not have been
reasonably foreseen.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
152. Id. (citing Stevens v. Parke-Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (1973)).
153. Richards, 95 N.M. at 679, 625 P.2d at 1196.
154. Id. at 680, 625 P.2d at 1197.
155. The court stated that "[wihile the recommendation for topical use was with-
drawn in two of the 1971 PDR supplements, there is no doubt that, at one time not too
distant from the incident in this suit, Upjohn recommended its product to physicians as
being effective for the very use to which [the doctor] put it." Id.
156. Id. The court also noted Mulder was not apposite because in that case "the
physician testified he was aware of the dangers of the drug and of the dosage recom-
mended by the drug company, but simply chose not to be governed by that information."
Id. at 680-81, 625 P.2d at 1197-98. In Richards, both physicians had testified that they
were not aware of the dangers associated with the use of neomycin sulfate nor were they
aware that such usage was no longer recommended. Id. at 681, 625 P.2d at 1198.
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quate, and it was foreseeable that doctors might not consult the
PDR or package inserts before using the drug, the actual failure
of a doctor to consult the inadequate warnings does not consti-
tute an independent intervening cause relieving a drug company,
whose warnings were inadequate, from liability. 157
The very facts of Richards belie the court's decision. The
administration of the drug and the resulting deafness of the
plaintiff occurred in 1973, over two years after the drug's topical
use recommendation had been withdrawn.158 The court relied on
Dr. Weaver's testimony to show that it was foreseeable that Dr.
Weaver would not reread the PDR before administering the
drug. 59 The warning found in the PDR and the package inserts
had been altered over two years before the physician prescribed
the drug for the plaintiff.' During that two year period, trade
advertisements 6' may have appeared and "Dear Doctor" let-
ters162 may have been sent to prescribing physicians. Although it
may be foreseeable that a physician would not know of a PDR
warning more than two years after it has been changed, it is not
necessarily "reasonable." It is certainly unreasonable and impos-
sible to require a drug manufacturer to personally call each
treating physician or to stand next to the doctor every time he
prescribes the medication,6 3 which is the only absolute way to
157. Id. at 680, 625 P.2d at 1197. In support of its position, the court cited to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449, which reads: "If the likelihod that a third person
may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the
actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or crimi-
nal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby." Id.
158. Id. at 677, 625 P.2d at 1194.
159. Id. at 680, 625 P.2d at 1197. Dr. Weaver testified that it is not standard prac-
tice for a physician to reread the PDR every time a drug is given, especially when the
drug has been on the market for a long time. Id. In addition, evidence was presented to
show that neomycin sulfate had been used by physicians for over ten years. Id.
160. Id. at 677, 625 P.2d at 1194.
161. When a prescription drug is advertised by a drug manufacturer in the New
England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Association, or any
other physician's magazine, it is FDA policy that warnings of adverse reactions are
printed in the advertisement.
162. Often, when the directions or warnings for a prescription drug are altered, the
drug manufacturer is required to send doctors (who prescribe the medication) letters
informing them of the changes.
163. See Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987). In
Swayze, "[tihe plaintiff's son, Michael, died three years after surgery from ... an over-
dose of the narcotic anesthetic fentanyl, a prescription drug produced and marketed by
1988]
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insure that directions are read and followed. The court in Rich-
ards set a standard for reasonable foreseeability which a drug
manufacturer could rarely overcome.
The court in Formella v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.16 4 did not di-
rectly address the issue of "reasonable foreseeability" but in-
stead recognized the doctrine that when a physician fails to read
the warnings, there can be no negligence on the part of the drug
manufacturer for the insufficiency of the warnings. 6 5 While not-
ing that "[t]he adequacy of the warning is a question of fact,
properly left to the jury,"'' 6 the court recognized that the physi-
cian's failure to read the directions effectively removed the de-
termination of the warning's adequacy from the jury's
province.161
Similarly, in Peterson v. Parke-Davis & Co.,' 68 the defend-
ant drug company denied it had breached its duty to warn in
regard to the use of its product.6 9 The plaintiff Peterson suf-
fered from a severe overdose of the prescription drug Dilantin,
the defendant. During the operation, the drug was administered to Michael without
proper supervision from an anesthesiologist or the supervising surgeon. The plaintiff ar-
gued that the defendant should be charged with knowledge that the administering of
anesthetic drugs without prescription is a violation of Mississippi law. Id. at 465. The
court noted that it was "impractical and unrealistic to expect drug manufacturers to
police individual operating rooms to determine which doctors adequately supervise their
surgical teams." Id. at 471. The defendant could not be expected to control the individ-
ual practices of the individual members of the medical community. Id. at 472.
164. 100 Mich. App. 649, 300 N.W.2d 356 (1981). See supra note 66.
165. Id. at 656, 300 N.W.2d at 359. The PDR and other publications stated that
blood tests should be given weekly to older people taking the drug and it was also recom-
mended that they not take it longer than one week. The drug was also contraindicated
for drug allergies, such as Mrs. Formella's allergy to penicillin. Id.
166. Id. (citing Gutowski v. M. & R. Plastic & Coating, Inc., 60 Mich. App. 499, 506-
08, 231 N.W.2d 456, 460-61 (1975)). See also Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405
Mich. 75, 90, 273 N.W.2d 476, 480 (1979) (holding that when liability turns on the ade-
quacy of the warning, the issue is one of reasonable care).
167. Plaintiff's expert Dr. Lerman stated that he felt the PDR warning and package
inserts were inadequate in view of their length and the presence of inconsistencies. As an
example of an inconsistency, Dr. Lerman noted that the warnings stated both that the
drug should not be given to individuals who were senile as well as warnings that the drug
should not be used for over a week in persons over age 60. Dr. Lerman also testified that
he did not prescribe the drug to people over age 60 because of the warnings against such
use. He concluded that if the warnings were read, they were adequate. Formella, 100
Mich. App. at 654, 300 N.W.2d at 358.
168. 705 P.2d 1001 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
169. Id. at 1003.
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/2
MISUSE DEFENSE
an anticonvulsant medication 170 which had been prescribed to
control an apparent epileptic seizure.1 7 1 When he began to act in
a confused manner he was admitted first to a general hospital
and then to a psychiatric center for observation. At the psychi-
atric center he came under the care of Dr. Mardock 172 who con-
tinued the administration of the drug without checking the
package insert or the PDR. Peterson's condition deteriorated
and he developed difficulties with walking, speaking, balance, co-
ordination, and mental alertness. He also experienced dizziness
and unsteadiness.17' Blood serum tests found a toxic level of the
drug, and Peterson was taken off Dilantin, but only after brain
damage had occurred. 74
At trial, it was alleged that the warnings which accompanied
Dilantin did not adequately warn of the possibility of permanent
neurological damage from Dilantin toxicity which could arise
when the dosage was too high. 75 Parke-Davis asserted that the
warnings were adequate and that it was the physician's misuse
of the drug which caused Peterson's injuries. 17 The psychiatrist,
Dr. Mardock, testified that he had not read the package insert
nor had he consulted the PDR pertaining to Dilantin since
1966.177 Furthermore, Dr. Mardock did not have blood serum
tests done on Peterson, even when Peterson showed signs of Di-
lantin toxicity.178
Noting the warnings in the package insert, 179 the court up-
held the verdict and judgment for Parke-Davis. The court found
no merit in the plaintiffs contention that the court erred in re-
fusing to instruct the jury that Parke-Davis had a duty to warn
the entire medical community, and not just the attending physi-
cian.' 80 More importantly, the court found that when an attend-
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1002-03.
173. Id. at 1003.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. Parke-Davis' warnings on the use of Dilantin stated that if toxic effects
occurred, the drug dosage should be reduced or discontinued. Id.
180. Id. at 1003-04. Here, as in other cases, the concern was with the warning given
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ing physician prescribes the use of a drug but disregards the
manufacturer's warnings and instructions, the physician's con-
duct is what renders the product unreasonably dangerous, and
thus defective. The adequacy or inadequacy of the warnings and
instructions are not relevant.18'
The court in Rhoto v. Ribando,'s2 also found that warnings
supplied by the drug manufacturers adequately informed the
patient through her doctor of known risks associated with the
normal use of their products, and thus the manufacturers could
not be held liable for injuries resulting from the misuse of their
products.8 " The plaintiff had claimed that the warnings for the
individual drugs were inadequate in that they did not have
timely warnings about the misuse of their products in weight
control programs, a practice plaintiff claimed the drug's manu-
facturers knew or should have known was taking place. 84
The court noted that Dr. Ribando's prescription of the com-
bination of drugs was a gross misuse of the products,'8 5 and that
a manufacturer is required only to provide an adequate warning
to the attending physician. Whether others were warned is irrelevant. Id. at 1004.
181. Id. at 1003. See Uptain v. Huntington Laboratories, Inc., 685 P.2d 218 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984), cert. granted, July 16, 1984 (in a products liability action against the
manufacturers of a cleaning compound, the court found the misuse defense was available
where the manufacturer could reasonably assume that the warning would be read and
heeded); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976). The Peterson
court stated: "Misuse of a product is all possible types of use, or conduct affecting use,
by the plaintiff or a third party which is improper in light of the qualities and character-
istics of the product itself." Id. at 1003 (citing Uptain, 685 P.2d at 218).
The Peterson court also stated: " 'Misuse . . . which cannot reasonably be antici-
pated by the manufacturer can be utilized as a defense in a products liability case by
showing that the conduct of the user [here the attending physician], and not the alleged
defect in the product, actually caused the [injury].'" Id. at 1003 (quoting Jackson v.
Harsco Corp., 673 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1983)).
182. 504 So. 2d 1119 (La. Ct. App. 1987). Mrs. Judy Rhoto was examined by Dr.
R.T. Ribando, who claimed to be a weight reduction specialist. Although he had not
received specialized training in bariatric medicine, he prescribed a regimen of prescrip-
tion medications and a conservative diet plan, which allegedly produced significant
weight loss. Mrs. Rhoto took Ortho Novum, a birth control pill; Thyrolar 5, a thyroid
medication; Renese, a diuretic; human chorionic gonadotropin, a fertility hormone; and
Eskatrol, an amphetamine. After two weeks Mrs. Rhoto suffered a massive stroke. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1124.
185. Id. Both the expert called by plaintiffs and the expert called by defendants
agreed that the combination of drugs used by Dr. Ribando was a gross misuse of the
products. They also testified that they would never have prescribed such a diet plan.
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of any danger arising from the normal use of its product when
such danger is not within the knowledge of, or obvious to, the
ordinary user.18
Finally, there are those situations in which the adequacy of
the warning cannot be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
juries because the prescribing physician had prior knowledge of
the risks inherent in the use of the drug.
In Stanback v. Parke-Davis & Co., 1 8 7 the court held that
when a physician prescribes a drug with full knowledge of the
risks associated with the use of that drug, the drug manufacturer
is insulated from any liability resulting from its failure to
warn. s18 In Stanback, the plaintiff, after receiving a flu vaccine,
was diagnosed as having Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS), a neu-
rological disorder. 89 The manufacturer of the flu vaccine, Parke-
Davis, did not warn of the risk of GBS associated with the vac-
cine in its 1976 package insert. 90 Dr. Edmunds testified that he
had not read the package insert accompanying the vaccine but
he was aware of the risk of GBS associated with the use of the
drug. 191 The court distinguished between a case in which the
physician might have responded to an adequate warning and a
case in which it is clearly established that the physician would
not have so responded. In the first case, evidence of causation
may be established; in the latter case it cannot be.192 In Stan-
186. Id. at 1123 (quoting Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110,
114-15 (La. 1986)). Upon reading PDR warnings, the court found that most of the pre-
scribed drugs either warned against the use of the drug for the treatment of obesity, did
not indicate a use in weight control programs, or warned against the use while smoking.
See id. at 1124-26.
187. 657 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff suffered an attack of influenza with
bronchitis during the spring of 1976. Because of that illness, she resolved to get a flu shot
the following fall. She returned to her doctor's office on September 23, 1976, at which
time she received a half-dose of Fluogen, a Parke-Davis flu vaccine. She subsequently
received a second half-dose of the flu vaccination on October 27, 1976, and soon began to
experience neurological symptoms. She was eventually diagnosed as having Guillain-
Barre Syndrome. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 644.
190 Id. Mrs. Stanback was unaware of any such risk when she received the vaccina-
tions. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 645-46. The court referred to the following cases: Chambers v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (plain-
tiff failed to establish causation when evidence showed that warnings of risks associated
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back, no evidence was presented indicating that Parke-Davis'
failure to warn the patient's physician was a factor in producing
her injury, since Dr. Edmunds' decisions and actions would not
have been affected in the least by the communication of an ade-
quate warning.'9
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Mowery v. Crit-
tenton Hospital9 " held that the defendant drug company's fail-
ure to adequately warn the physician due to inadequate testing
is not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries where the
physician was aware of the drug's risks from other sources of
information. 195 The court noted that even if the physician had
been given additional warnings by the drug company of the risks
with the use of a drug would not have made a difference in physician's treatment of
plaintiff); Vaughn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 272 Or. 367, 536 P.2d 1247 (1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976) (no evidence was presented that had a physician been properly
warned he would have treated plaintiff differently so there was no proof of causation);
but cf. McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974) (sub-
stantial evidence was presented that had adequate warnings been given to physicians,
they would have recommended that plaintiff cease using the drug before her injuries
became irreversible and therefore, there was sufficient proof of causation). Id. at 646.
193. Id. In an affidavit, Dr. Edmunds stated: "It is not my practice, and I do not
deem it necessary, to advise patients about the package insert 'warning' which accompa-
nies flu vaccines. This was true before the Guillain-Barre Syndrome [sic] warning in 1976
and it is true today." Id. at 644.
194. 155 Mich. App. 711, 400 N.W.2d 633 (1987). A patient suffered a retinal de-
tachment after her physician prescribed phospholine iodide to prevent the dislocation of
the patient's artificial intraocular lens. The physician explained the risks of retinal de-
tachment and possible complications arising from the use of general anesthesia to the
plaintiff. Id. at 713-14, 400 N.W.2d at 634-35.
Despite the risks of retinal detachment with the use of Phospholine Iodide, Dr.
Malach prescribed this eye medication because it could prevent dislocation of the
intraocular lens. Such dislocation could damage the cornea's endothelium (the
outer covering of the eye), which would require a corneal transplant.
Because plaintiff's intraocular implant lens was again dislocated .... Dr.
Malach discontinued the Phospholine Iodide. After several unsuccessful attempts
to medically reposition the lens, Dr. Malach successfully surgically repositioned it.
Phospholine Iodide was again used during the procedure.
Id. at 714, 400 N.W.2d at 635. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff complained of a change of
vision in her right eye and sought treatment from another doctor who diagnosed retinal
detachment. Id.
195. Id. at 721, 400 N.W.2d at 638. Dr. Malach testified that she was aware of the
risk of retinal detachment resulting from the use of phospholine iodide from reading
opthalmologic literature, a source other than the defendant. Despite this knowledge Dr.
Malach prescribed the drug for the plaintiff, stating that it was worth the risks involved.
Id.
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/2
MISUSE DEFENSE
of the drug, she probably still would have prescribed it. e6
IV. Conclusion
A prescription drug's package inserts, PDR drug references,
and other printed matter all exist to educate the physician con-
cerning the benefits and dangers of the prescription drug. Most
physicians are cautious and read the PDR, the package inserts,
"Dear Doctor" letters, and any other information available
before they prescribe a medication.
Some physicians, however, for inexplicable reasons, either
read the drug's warnings and ignore them, or fail to read them
at all. Such negligence on the part of these physicians can lead
to tragic results. The manufacturer of the prescription drug can-
not be held responsible for this intervening proximate cause, nor
can the manufacturer be an absolute insurer of its products. Vir-
tually all prescription drug products have adverse side effects
and the drug manufacturers have the responsibility to provide
adequate warnings. Once these warnings are provided, it is up to
the physician to read them and abide by them.
It is important for the courts to recognize and apply the
misuse defense because of the economic resources expended by
the drug manufacturers and their insurers in the defense of
these actions. As defense and liability costs mount, manufactur-
ers of beneficial prescription drugs with potentially dangerous
side effects will undoubtedly raise the price of their products197
or stop manufacturing the "risky" but highly beneficial drugs.""
196. Id.
197. Costly court judgments have forced up insurance costs to vaccine makers, fuel-
ing a dramatic price rise. The cost of Lederle's DPT (diptheria-pertussis-tetanus) vac-
cine to physicians, for example, shot up to $11.40 in 1986 from 50 cents in 1982, with
$8.00 of that amount earmarked for liability insurance. New York Times May 15, 1988, §
3, at 15. During this period several of Lederle's DPT insurers did not renew coverage,
and Lederle eventually had to provide its own coverage by setting up a liability reserve
fund. Id.
198. See Hoenig, Products Liability: Recent Developments, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 1988,
at 1, col. 1:
Thus, the "broader public in the availability of drugs at an affordable price must
be considered in deciding the appropriate standard of liability .. " Reluctance of
drug manufacturers to undertake research programs to develop beneficial
pharmaceuticals or to market others that are available might result from the "fear
of large adverse money judgments." Similarly, the "additional expense of insuring
against liability - assuming insurance would be available - and of research
19881
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Such a result will invariably have an adverse effect on consumer-
patients because it will ultimately deprive them of the very
product which could alleviate their suffering.
programs to reveal possible dangers not detectable by available scientific methods
could place the cost of medication beyond the reach of those who need it most."
Id. at 2, cols. 4-5 (quoting Brown v. Superior Court, 88 Daily J. D.A.R. 4211, 4213 (Calif.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 31, 1988)).
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